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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(j) (2005).
ISSUE PRESENTED
Whether a retained expert witness in a medical malpractice action should be
absolutely prohibited under Utah Code Annotated § 78-14-12 (2005) from viewing the
documents, reports, or medical records relating to the malpractice case, simply because those
documents were also submitted to the prelitigation panel for its own review.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
There are two rulings at issue in this appeal: (1) the trial court's ruling granting
summary judgment in favor of Dr. Bruce Chamberlain and Central Utah Medical Clinic, and
(2) the trial court's earlier ruling declaring a mistrial.1 As will be set forth more fully below,
the summary judgment ruling was expressly based on the continued validity of the mistrial
ruling. That mistrial ruling was in turn based on the trial court's erroneous interpretation of
Utah Code Annotated § 78-14-12(l)(d).

1

There were two named Defendants in this case: Dr. Bruce Chamberlain and Central
Utah Medical Clinic. In the Complaint, Munson alleged that Dr. Chamberlain was an
employee of Central Utah Medical Clinic at all times relevant to this suit. R. at 4,1J4. This
allegation was admitted in the Answer. R. at 12, f3. Both Defendants have been represented
by the same counsel throughout the proceedings and jointlyfiledthe motion at issue in this
appeal. For purposes of conciseness and convenience, this brief will only refer to Dr.
Chamberlain when discussing the positions taken by the two Defendants, except where
reference to Central Utah Medical Clinic is otherwise specifically necessary.
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"Whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment is a question of law that
we review for correctness, according no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions."
Shaw Res. Ltd., L.L.C. v. Pruitt. Gushee & BachtelL P.C. 2006 UT App 313. f20. - P.3d (quotations and citations omitted). A trial court's decision to grant or deny a mistrial will
ordinarily not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. West Valley City v.
Patten. 1999 UT App 149, Tf7, 981 P.2d 420. As with the review of a summary judgment
ruling, however, this Court affords no deference to a trial court's discretionary ruling when
the appellate challenge is based on the trial court's interpretation of a case or statute.
In Walker v. Union Pacific Railroad. Co.. 844 P.2d 335 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), this
Court thus held that "an abuse of discretion will be found when a trial court's decision to
exclude an expert is induced by a misperception of the law." Id. at 343. In Gaw v.
Department of Transportation. 798 P.2d 1130 (Utah Ct. App 1990), this Court similarly held
that "the trial court does not properly exercise [its] discretion where its decision is based
upon a misconception of law." kL at 1134; see also In re CarmaletaB.. 579 P.2d 514, 523
(Cal. 1978) ("[W]e recognize that such discretion can only be truly exercised if there is no
misconception by the trial court as to the legal basis for its action."); cf, Gregerson v. Jensen.
617 P.2d 369, 372 (Utah 1980).
In Ferris v. Jennings. 595 P.2d 857 (Utah 1979), the Utah Supreme Court therefore
held that in cases where a discretionary ruling was based on an incorrect understanding of
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the law, "the party aversely affected thereby is entitled to have the error rectified and a proper
adjudication under correct principles of law." Id. at 859.
DETERMINATIVE PROVISION
Utah Code Annotated § 78-14-12(l)(d) (2005) is determinative of this appeal Section
78-14-12(l)(d) governs the prelitigation panels that initially adjudicate medical malpractice
cases, and states that "[proceedings conducted under authority of this section are
confidential, privileged, and immune from civil process."

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
PROCEDURAL POSTURE
The Complaint in this medical malpractice case wasfiledon October 19,2001. R. at
4, On the morning of trial, Dr. Chamberlain moved for the disqualification of Munson's
expert witness. R. at 240. Following argument, the trial court declined to grant the request
for an immediate disqualification, but instead granted a mistrial. R. at 239. An Order of
Mistrial was officially entered on March 15, 2004. R. at 263.
On March 29, 2006, the trial court heard arguments on Munson's Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order of Mistrial, as well as on Dr. Chamberlain's Motion for
Summary Judgment. R. at 539. On April 24,2006, the trial court entered an order denying
Munson's Motion for Reconsideration and granting Dr. Chamberlain's Motion for Summary
Judgment. R. at 546. Munson filed a Notice of Appeal with the Utah Supreme Court on
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May 5,2006. R. at 551. OnMay 16,2006, the Utah Supreme Court transferred this appeal
to this Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Rebekah Munson was a patient of Dr. Bruce Chamberlain from July 1999 through
November 1999. R. at 3, ^7-10. 2 During that time, Dr. Chamberlain misdiagnosed Ms.
Munson's condition and then unnecessarily gave her a prescription for steroids. R. at 2, ^ 17.
As a result of these actions, Munson suffered substantial injuries. R. at 2, ^]19.
Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-14-12 (2005), Munson commenced her legal
action against Dr. Chamberlain by filing a Notice of Intent to Commence Action (Notice of
Intent) and by then obtaining a review from a prelitigation panel. See R. at 3, ^|6. Munson
submitted four sets of documents to the prelitigation panel: (1) the statutorily required Notice
of Intent; (2) an opinion letter regarding the case prepared for her attorney by Dr. Greg
Kane;3 (3) the medical records from Central Utah Medical Clinic and Dr. Chamberlain; and

2

When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the court views the facts and all
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Shaw Res. Ltd.,
L.L.C. v. Pruitt Gushee & BachtelL P.C. 2006 UT App 313, ^[20, - P.3d - (quotations and
citations omitted).
3

Redacted copies of the Notice of Intent and of Dr. Kane's letter are included in the
Exhibits folder of the appellate file. See R. at 556, Defendant's Exhibits 3 & 5. As indicated
in the non-redacted heading to Dr. Kane's letter, Dr. Kane's opinion was set forth in an April
2, 2001, letter addressed to Kenneth Parkinson, who was Munson's trial counsel. See id.
This opinion letter from Dr. Kane to Mr. Parkinson was then apparently forwairded on to the
prelitigation panel as support for Munson's position.
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(4) the medical records from Dr. Richard Gremillion. R. at 556, Defendants' Exhibit 6; see
also Order of Mistrial R. at 262, %4.
After the prelitigation review had been completed, Munson filed a Complaint against
Dr. Chamberlain. R. at 4, Although Munson had submitted the opinion letterfromDr. Kane
to the prelitigation panel, she ultimately chose to retain another expert witness for purposes
of testifying at trial. Using Dr. Kane as a consultant, Munson located Dr. Alexander Jacobs
and retained him to serve as her expert witness at trial. The relationship between Dr. Kane
and Dr. Jacobs was later explained to the trial court by Mr. Parkinson as follows:
MR. PARKINSON: Dr. Cane (sic) is a -a person hired to do an initial
evaluation of a case, to tell us whether we have a case; and Dr. Cane, in fact
. . . then found Dr. Jacobs for us. He's a middleman, so to speak. Provides an
initial evaluation, and then found Dr. Jacobs.
THE COURT: He's not a broker.
MR. PARKINSON: In a sense he is, your Honor. Sure, sure. He's an M.D.;
and he has no intent of testifying at trial on these cases. He provides an-does
an initial review, gives you an idea about the viability of your case, and then
finds a doctor who can-who is willing and able to testify. That's his position.
R. at 554, p. 10.
On December 31, 2001, Mr. Parkinson submitted a comprehensive set of medical
records and documents relating to the case to Dr. Jacobs for his review. R. at 556,
Defendants' Exhibit 1. Included were medical records from six different doctors, as well as
records from an emergency room visit that Munson had made on December 18,1998. R. at
556, Defendants' Exhibit 1. In addition to these records, Mr. Parkinson enclosed a copy of
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the Notice of Intent, as well as a copy of the initial review that had been prepared for him by
Dr. Kane. R. at 556, Defendants' Exhibit 1. Regarding the Notice of Intent, Mr. Parkinson
explained that it had been included because it "outlines the facts and liability issues of the
case." R. at 556, Defendants' Exhibit 1.
On June 19, 2002, Munson filed Dr. Jacobs' expert report. R. at 47. Dr.
Chamberlain's counsel took the deposition of Dr. Jacobs on November 18,2002. R. at 11798. During that deposition, Dr. Chamberlain's counsel conducted an extensive examination
of Dr. Jacobs regarding both his qualifications and his opinions relating to the case. Dr.
Jacobs was the only expert witness whom Munson designated and prepared for trial.
On February 24,2004, literally on the afternoon before the trial was set to begin, Dr.
Chamberlain's counsel contacted Mr. Parkinson via facsimile. R. at 262, ^fl. In that facsimile,
Dr. Chamberlain's counsel informed Mr. Parkinson that he would be moving to disqualify
Dr. Jacobs from testifying due to the fact that Dr. Jacobs had been allowed to view some of
the documents that had been submitted to the prelitigation panel. R. at 262, f I. Specifically,
Dr. Chamberlain's counsel objected to the fact that Dr. Jacobs had viewed (1) the Notice of
Intent, and (2) the letter from Dr. Kane to Mr. Parkinson setting forth Dr. Kane's initial view
of the case. R. at 554, p. 5. Dr. Chamberlain's counsel asserted that these disclosures
violated the confidentiality requirement of Utah Code Annotated § 78-14-12(l)(d).
Rather than dealing with this dispositive motion mi d-trial, Mr. Parkinson preemptively
raised the issue before the trial court prior to the beginning of the trial. R. at 554, p. 5.
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Though no written briefing was ever filed on the matter, both parties had the opportunity to
argue the merits of the motion before the court. R. at 554, pp. 5-41. After consideration of
the arguments, the trial court issued a ruling from the bench. In its ruling, the court
concluded that Dr. Jacobs' exposure to the Notice of Intent and the Dr. Kane review had
constituted a "breach of confidentiality" under Utah Code Annotated § 78-14-12, R, at 554,
p. 37. The trial court based this conclusion on the fact that these documents had earlier been
submitted to the prelitigation panel. Rather than disqualifying Dr. Jacobs at that time,
however (thereby resulting in an adverse ruling on the merits), the trial court instead declared
a mistrial, thus preserving Munson's ability to try the case in the future using a different
expert. R. at 554, pp. 38-39.
On October 26,2005, Dr. Chamberlain filed a motion for summary judgment. R. at
332. Dr. Chamberlain argued that because Munson had not designated a new expert, her case
ought to be dismissed due to a failure to provide expert testimony. R. at 339-334. In
response, Munsonfileda motion for reconsideration of the ruling with respect to Dr. Jacobs'
eligibility to testify, arguing that the trial court ought to instead allow Dr. Jacobs to testify
as had previously been planned. R. at 368. On March 29, 2006, the trial court heard oral
arguments on both motions. R. at 541. The court issued a ruling on April 24,2006, denying
Munson's motion for reconsideration. Given that Munson had not retained a new expert
witness, Dr. Chamberlain's motion for summary judgment was granted. R. at 546-43. On
May 5, 2006, Munson filed a Notice of Appeal.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in concluding that § 78-14-12(l)(d) was violated in this case.
There are two principal reasons why the trial court's rulings should be overturned.
First, this Court should hold that retained expert witnesses are allowed to view all
information relating to a case without breaching any confidentiality requirements. Applied
to this case, this rule would allow Dr. Jacobs to view the preHtigation materials without being
subject to sanction.
Second, this Court should also overturn the trial court's rulings under the absurd
results doctrine. Under the trial court's overly expansive view of § 78-14-12(l)(d), expert
witnesses would now be prevented from viewing any documents that had earlier been
presented to the preHtigation panel-including the medical records at issue in a case. This rule
would accordingly create an incentive for lawyers to limit the information that they provide
to the preHtigation panels, thereby hindering the ability of those panels to conduct proper
reviews of the disputes before them.
ARGUMENT
The trial court erred when it concluded that the confidentiality requirement set forth
in Utah Code Annotated § 78-14-12(l)(d) (2005) was violated in this case. The court's
conclusion was incorrect as a matter of law and should now be overturned.4

4

As noted above, the trial court's erroneous interpretation of § 78-14-12(l)(d) was the
sole predicate for its decision to grant a mistrial and to forbid Dr. Jacobs from testifying; that
decision was then the sole predicate for granting summary judgment in favor of Dr.
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Section 78-14-12(l)(d) is specifically applicable to lawsuitsfiledagainst doctors and
other health care professionals under the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. See generally
Utah Code Annotated §§ 78-14-1 through -17 (2005). Under § 78-14-12, a prospective
litigant who wishes tofilesuit against a health care provider mustfirstobtain a review of the
case from a prelitigation panel. This three member panel is comprised of one lawyer, one
health care provider, and one lay member selected from the general public. See generally
Utah Code Annotated §78-14-12(4). These prelitigation panel reviews are "informal [and]
nonbinding," "but are compulsory as a condition precedent to commencing litigation." Utah
Code Annotated § 78-14-12(l)(c). Upon conclusion of the prelitigation panel review, "all
evidence, documents, and exhibits are returned to the parties or witnesses who ... provided
the evidence." Utah Code Annotated § 78-14-13 (2005). Under § 78-14-12(l)(d), the
"proceedings" of the prelitigation panels are to be kept confidential.
Doe v. Maret 1999 UT 74, 984 P.2d 980, is the only Utah decision to address the
scope of § 78-14-12(1 )(d)!s confidentiality requirement. In Doe, the defendant psychiatrists
had sought permission to depose the plaintiffs prior lawyers regarding their representation
of her in an earlier action. Id. atffi|2-4.The plaintiff objected, arguing that the details of the
representation were privileged under the attorney-client privilege. Id The issue on appeal
was whether the plaintiff had waived her claim to the privilege during her deposition. See

Chamberlain. Given that both rulings are based on the same erroneous conclusion of law,
the argument section of this brief will discuss the meaning of § 78-14-12(l)(d) in general
terms without necessarily differentiating between the two resultant rulings.
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14 at ^5. After examining the facts and law of the case, id. atfflJ7-19,the supreme court
resolved the issue before it by holding that the plaintiff had partially waived the privilege in
that particular instance. Id. at ^[20.
After concluding its analysis of the privilege issue, the supreme court then conducted
a brief, sua sponte examination of what it referred to as uan unrelated issue.'1' Id at f21. The
court noted that the defendants had attached the plaintiffs Notice of Intent to their appellate
brief, and that the defendants had then quoted from the document in their argument. Id The
court then held that the Notice of Intent is part of the "proceedings" of the prelitigation panel
and that its confidentiality must therefore be preserved under §78-14-12(1 )(d). Id Though
the court declined to impose sanctions for the public dissemination of the document in that
case, the court nevertheless suggested that sanctions might be warranted in the future for
similar violations. Id Section 78-14-12(l)(d)'s confidentiality requirement has not been
addressed by a subsequent appellate decision, nor has the statute itself been modified since
Doe.5 As such, the language in § 78-14-12(l)(d) and the brief discussion of it in Doe were
the sole bases for Dr. Chamberlain's motion below and for the trial court's subsequent
rulings.

5

The Legislature did amend § 78-14-12 in 2002, but that amendment only addressed
the provisions in § 78-14-12(5) authorizing the Division of Occupational and Professional
Licensing to fine health care providers who refuse to participate in prelitigation panels.
Those provisions are not at issue in this appeal.
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In arguing that the confidentiality requirement was breached in this case, Dr.
Chamberlain asserted below that Munson had erred by providing Dr. Jacobs with (1) the
Notice of Intent, and (2) the initial review of the case prepared for Mr. Parkinson by Dr.
Kane. R. at 554, pp. 5-6. Dr. Chamberlain's argument was that because the prelitigation
proceedings are confidential, any documents or evidence that were submitted to the panel
must also remain confidential and cannot subsequently be viewed by anybody, particularly
by a prospective witness who wishes to testify at trial. Dr. Chamberlain's counsel thus
argued that "[t]he Healthcare Malpractice Act makes it clear that the pre-litigation hearing
proceedings are confidential. They're privileged; and evidence that is presented to the panel
must remain confidential." R. at 554, p.6 (emphasis added). The trial court accepted this
expansive view of the confidentiality requirement. The court held that Dr. Kane's initial
review of the case was part of the "prelitigation materials" because it had "previously been
submitted to the prelitigation panel." R. at 262, <|3. The court then held as a matter of law
that all prelitigation materials are subject to the confidentiality requirement of § 78-1412(l)(d). R. at 261-60, ffl[l-4. As a result, the court ultimately concluded that "an expert
witness who has been given access to confidential prelitigation materials should be
disqualified." R. at260,1f5.6

6

As noted above, the trial court ultimately decided to enforce the sanction in this case
by granting a mistrial, thus "preserving] Plaintiffs case." R. at 260, ^7. Under the express
terms of the ruling, however, Dr. Jacobs would be prevented from testifying at any future
proceeding.
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The issue presented by this appeal, then, is a narrow one: does § 78-14-12(l)(d)'s
confidentiality requirement require the disqualification of an expert witness who has viewed
documents or evidence that were earlier submitted to the prelitigation panel? For the
following reasons, this Court should hold that such disqualification is not warranted.
I.

THERE WAS NO BREACH OF THE CONFIDENTIALITY REQUIREMENT IN
THIS CASE BECAUSE EXPERT WITNESSES ARE ENTITLED TO HAVE
ACCESS TO CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION.
The trial court's threshold conclusion that there was a breach of confidentiality in this

case was incorrect. Specifically, the trial court erred by failing to recognize that retained
expert witnesses are allowed to view confidential information relating to a case without
violating any confidentiality mandate, and that Dr. Jacobs was therefore entitled to view the
documents in question.
While the law of confidentiality recognizes that attorneys must take care to protect the
confidential information with which they are entrusted, the law also recognizes that attorneys
do not work in a vacuum. In this world of complex law and complex litigation, the days in
which attorneys drafted pleadings by hand and tried cases with little or no outside help have
become relics of our professional past. In order to facilitate the modern law practice, the law
instead now recognizes that an attorney has the right to be assisted by support personnel, and
that an attorney then has the authority to release confidential information to those persons
without violating any duties of confidentiality.
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The Restatement expressly recognizes this, stating that "[a] lawyer generally has
authority to use or disclose confidential client information to persons assisting the lawyer in
representing the client." Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 60, cmt. f.
Regarding the question of who these persons are who "assist the lawyer in representing the
client," the Restatement specifically states that disclosure is appropriate to "lawyers in the
same firm and employees such as secretaries and paralegals. A lawyer also may disclose
information to independent contractors who assist in the representation, such as investigators,
lawyers in otherfirms,prospective expert witnesses ... to the extent reasonably appropriate
in the client's behalf." Id. For purposes of litigation, these persons are not treated as
outsiders or as members of the general public, but are instead regarded as "representatives"
or "agents" of the lawyer. Utah R. Evid. 504(a)(3); Restatement (Third) of Law Governing
Lawyers § 70. As agents of the lawyer, those persons have the ability to view and review
sensitive documents without violating any confidentiality dictate. Thus, disclosure to those
persons carries no more legal significance than disclosure to the attorney herself.
It is only in this context that the role of the expert can properly be understood. As
noted above, the Restatement includes "prospective expert witnesses" as being among those
persons who "assist in the representation" and who are authorized to view confidential
information. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 60, cmt. f. There is a
clear reason for this: in the modern world of complex litigation, expert testimony is not only
helpful, but is in fact often required in order to explain the facts or the issues to the judge and
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jury. This requirement manifests itself in a number of ways. For example, Utah law
expressly requires a litigant who brings a medical malpractice claim to support the claim with
expert testimony regarding the standard of care. See Dikeou v. Osborn, 881 P.2d 943, 946
n.6 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). The reason for this requirement is that "the nature of the [medical]
profession removes the particularities of its practice from the knowledge and understanding
of the average citizen." Nixdorf v. Hicken. 612 P.2d 348,351-52 (Utah 1980). Indeed, this
was the very rule that Dr. Chamberlain invoked in this case in requesting summary judgment.
R. at 336; R. at 544. In addition, a number of courts have held that lay witnesses are
prevented from testifying about subjects that are deemed to be beyond the scope of common
knowledge, see generally State v. Rothlisberger. 2004 UT App 226,ffl[15-23,95P.3d 1193,
cert, granted 106 P.3d 743, an approach that has been codified in the Federal Rules of
Evidence. See Fed. R. Evid. 701, advisory cmte notes.
Given the central role that expert testimony plays in modern litigation, the courts have
long recognized that these expert witnesses must be able to view, analyze, and testify
regarding confidential information. In In re Anonymous, 283 F.3d 627 (4th Cir. 2002), for
example, an attorney and his client had had a dispute regarding who would pay for certain
expenses that had been incurred in a mediation before the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
Mediator. IdL at 630. The client and the attorney agreed to settle the fee dispute through
arbitration. Id. In their pleadings to the arbitration panel, the attorney and the client both
openly referred to and discussed the events involved in the mediation. Id. Like the
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prelitigation proceedings at issue in this case, mediations are also considered to be
confidential; as such, the arbitration pleadings prompted a referral to the Fourth Circuit for
a determination of whether the parties should be sanctioned for having violated their
confidentiality obligations by discussing the mediation in their arbitration pleadings. Id,
In the course of discussing the matter, the Fourth Circuit emphasized that while public
submissions of confidential information are prohibited, submission to the lawyer's assistants
or retained expert witnesses is not prohibited under the law of confidentiality:
We recognize circumstances where confidential material properly may be
divulged to someone other than one of the mediation participants without
obtaining prior consent of the Standing Panel [on Attorney Discipline]. For
instance, as in cases involving the protection of attorney-client confidentiality,
an attorney is permitted to consult with other employees of her law firm
and with experts or professionals retained by the law firm to aid in the
negotiation or structuring of the settlement, such as financial consultants,
without breaching confidentiality.
Id. at 633 n.10 (emphasis added).
Similarly, in Wauchop v. Domino's Pizza. Inc.. 138 F.R.D. 539 (N.D. Ind. 1991), the
court considered a discovery dispute that arose in the context of a personal injury case. In
that case, the issue involved a car accident that had allegedly been caused by a Domino's
Pizza driver's haste to comply with the company's "30 minute guarantee" policy. Id at 543.
In the course of discovery, the plaintiff wanted access to large amounts of sensitive
information regarding corporate meetings and policies. See id. In response, Domino's Pizza
claimed that much of the desired information was confidential and thus not subject to
discovery. In order to protect both parties' interests, the court issued a protective order
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setting forth the terms by which this sensitive discovery would be conducted. In that
protective order, the court held that "the disclosing defendants shall be permitted to restrict
disclosure of any and all confidential proprietary information provided . . . to the plaintiffs,
their counsel, and their consulting experts and expert witnesses solely for the purposes of
this litigation.5' Id. at 553 (emphasis added).
The federal district court in Dialog Information Services, Inc. v. American Chemical
Society, 1991 WL283718(D.D.C. 1991), examined a somewhat similar dispute and likewise
determined that the confidential information involved in that case would be accessible to the
parties' expert witnesses. Echoing the language of the Restatement, the court explained that
"to treat such material as 'confidential' means that such material shall be used solely for the
purposes of this litigation . . . and shall be available only to counsel to the parties (including
in-house counsel), counsel's legal associates and emplo)/ees, outside consultants (including
expert witnesses) assisting counsel in connection with the action and such party personnel
as counsel deems necessary in order to effectively represent the parties to this litigation." Id
at * 1 (emphasis added).
The decisions of these courts to allow disclosure of confidential information to the
opposing party's expert witnesses is not unique. Though the following list is by no means
exhaustive, the courts in each of these cases examined a discovery dispute and fashioned an
order that expressly allowed the disclosure of confidential information to the opposing
parties' expert witnesses. See Peskoff v. Faber. 230 F.R.D. 25, 36 (D.D.C. 2005); Tittle v.

Page 16 of 36

Enron Corp.. 2003 WL 22331270 at *2 (S.D. Tex. 2003); Bral Envtl. Servs. Inc. v. Shaw
Envtl. Inc.. 2003 WL 22843180 at *2-3 (D. Kan. 2003); Marshall. M.D. v. Spectrum Med.
Group. 198 F.R.D. 1, 5 (D. Maine 2000); Gillard v. Boulder Valley Sch. Dist. 196 F.R.D.
382, 388 (D. Colo. 2000); Biovail Corp. Int'l v. Hoechst Aktiengesellschaft. 1999 WL
33454801 at *3 (D. N.J. 1999); In re M & L Business Mach. Co.. Inc.. 167 B.R. 937,940 (D.
Colo. 1994); Brittain v. Stroh Brewery Co.. 136 F.R.D. 408,411,415 n.5 (M.D. N.C. 1991);
Langer v. Dista Prods. Co.. 1991 WL 349606 at *2 (N.D. 111. 1991); Inmates of New York
State with Human Immune Deficiency Virus v. Cuomo. 1991 WL 16032 at *3 (N.D.N.Y.
1991); Softel. Inc. v. Dragon Med. & Scientific Communications. Inc.. 1990 WL 164859 at
*8n.l (S.D.N.Y. 1990^: Jerky Hut Corp. y. L.B. Acquisition Corp.. 1989 WL 87972 at *2-3
(D. Ore. 1989); Verex Assurance. Inc. v. Paul J. Chainev. 1987 WL 14525 at *2 (S.D. Tex.
1987); Ex parte Miltope Corp.. 823 So.2d 640, 642 (Ala. 2001); Raymond Handling
Concepts Corp. v. Superior Court. 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 885, 886 (Cal. Ct. App. 1st Dist. Div. 4
1995); Myron v. Doctors Gen. Ltd.. 571 So.2d 591, 591-92 (Fla. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1990);
In re Detention of Marshall. 90 P.3d 1081, 1087 (Wash. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004).
Similarly, courts in the following cases considered discovery disputes where the
confidentiality concerns were so sensitive that a multi-tiered confidentiality order was set up
involving designations of material as either "confidential" or "highly confidential." In all of
these cases, the expert witnesses were considered to be among the persons able to view the
higher tier of restricted, "highly confidential" information. See, e.g.. Klay v. All Defendants.

Page 17 of 36

425 F.3d 977,985 (11th Cir. 2005); Agrizap. Inc. v. Woodstream. Corp.. 2005 WL 1772675
at * 1 (E.D. Penn. 2005); Team Plav. Inc. v. Bover. 2005 WL 256476 at * 1 (N.D. 111. 2005);
Jamsport Entm't LLC v. Paradama Prods. Inc.. 2005 WL 14917 at *2 (N.D. 111. 2005); IP
Innovation. LLC v. Thomson Inc.. 2004 WL 771233 at *2 (S.D. Ind. 2004); Blanchard & Co.
Inc. v. Barrick Gold Corp.. 2004 WL 737485 at * 5 (E.D. La. 2004); MedTronic Ave.. Inc.
v. Advanced Cardiovascular Svs. Inc.. 2004 WL 115594 at * 1 (D. Del. 2004); Beauchem
v. Rockford Prods. Corp.. 2003 WL 22344550 at * 1 (N.D. 111. 2003); Unicredito Italiano
SPA v. JP Morgan Chase Bank. 2003 WL 22960199 at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Gucci Am.. Inc.
v. Exclusive Imps. Int'l. 2000 WL 1357787 at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); ID Biomedical Corp. v.
TM Techs. Inc.. 1994 WL 384605 at *1 (Del.Ch. 1994).
The above string-citations are representative only, and are by no means exhaustive.
What they demonstrate, however, is the consistency with which courts have recognized that
expert witnesses are allowed to view protected, confidential information. The principle
behind these determinations is clear. If our litigation system is going to allow and sometimes
even require the use of expert witnesses to explain complicated matters, what good would
those witnesses be if they were not allowed to examine all the evidence, direct or indirect,
that is involved in the case? Suppose we weren't dealing with a medical malpractice action,
for example, but instead with a complicated corporate dispute. In such disputes, forensic
accountants are often called upon to examine and testify regarding the corporation's internal
financial documents.

Insofar as those documents reveal sensitive and proprietary
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information, however, a rule excluding expert witnesses from the category ofpersons entitled
to view the confidential information of the case would in effect deprive the expert witness
of the opportunity to do the very thing that he or she was retained to do.
In oral arguments below, the trial court expressed its belief that Dr. Jacobs had been
"tainted" because he had viewed information that had earlier been submitted to the
prelitigation panel and that was therefore confidential. R. at 554, p. 39. The problem with
this conclusion, however, is that Dr. Jacobs' role in this litigation was to review all available
information-whether confidential or not-and then render a qualified expert opinion about the
facts and issues. As a retained expert witness, he should have been deemed authorized to
view that information without the confidentiality requirement of § 78-14-12(l)(d) being in
any way violated.
Returning to the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Doe, there are two key aspects to
the improper disclosure in that case that are missingfromthe present situation. Thefirstis
that the disclosure in Doe was made in a publicly filed document-specifically, a publicly
filed appellate brief. See 1999 UT 74 at ^[21. Here, however, there has been no allegation
that Munson published the confidential documents in any public place or in any public
forum. Instead, the disclosure at issue occurred when Munson sent the documents to her own
retained expert witness for his internal review in conjunction with the litigation. This
contained, internal exposure is simply not analogous to the public disclosure that was at issue
in Doe.
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Second, it is noteworthy that the improper disclosure in Doe occurred when one party
made public use of the other party's documents in an adversarial fashion.

See id.

Specifically, the defendants in that case were reprimanded for having discussed the plaintiffs
Notice of Intent in their appellate brief. See id. Here, however, Munson has been
sanctioned for having sent her own Notice of Intent and her own expert report to another
expert that she had personally retained. Though subtle, the distinction between adversarial
use of confidential documents and internal use of confidential documents is well recognized
in the law. For example, while a person certainly has the authority under HIPPA to access
and discuss her own private medical records with whomever she pleases, an employer or
legal adversary who wishes to access those same records must obtain them through court
order or signed stipulation. Similarly, while the attorney client privilege acts as a bar against
an outside party who seeks to pry into such a relationship, there is no reason that the client
herself cannot voluntarily open that same door for her own purposes. Here, the disclosure
at issue was entirely internal. As such, there is simply no reason under § 78-14-12, under
Doe, or under the law of confidentiality that a party should be sanctioned for having passed
her own internal documentation to her own retained witnesses.
In response, Dr. Chamberlain argued below that such a disclosure is improper because
he couldn't cross-examine Dr. Jacobs regarding those documents during the trial itself. With
respect to the Dr. Kane review, for example, Dr. Chamberlain's counsel complained that "I
have no way of cross-examining Dr. Jacobs on the content of the Kane letter. It is privileged.
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There are omissions, there are inaccuracies, and it speaks to a relationship between those two
witnesses that I think demonstrates bias and is certainly a fertile field for cross examination
for me that I am precluded from approaching because of confidentiality." R. at 554, p. 8.7
The trial court accepted this argument, stating in the Order of Mistrial that it "recognize[d]
that Defendants should be able to vigorously cross-examine Dr. Jacobs, as his credibility is
crucial to Plaintiffs case, but that Defendants cannot now do so because the prelitigation
materials are confidential." R. at 259, f 8. There are several problems, however, with that
argument.
First, the threshold suggestion that Dr. Chamberlain could not have cross-examined
Dr. Jacobs regarding the information that Dr. Jacobs had viewed is simply incorrect. Like
the lawyers appearing before them, trial courts routinely deal with confidential information,
and have at their disposal a wide number of tools that allow them to protect the
confidentiality of such information while still allowing it to be examined in trial when
reasonably necessary. In Spratlev v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company,

7

In addition to the above reference, Dr. Chamberlain's counsel made repeated
representations regarding the substance of Dr. Kane's letter throughout his oral argument.
For example, he alleged that Dr. Kane had "made mistakes," R. at 554, p. 18, that there were
"inaccuracies" in Dr. Kane's review, R. at 554, p. 32, and that Dr. Jacobs had done "nothing
more than literally parrot the information contained" in Dr. Kane's review. R. at 554, pp. 31 32. There is a certain irony, of course, in Dr. Chamberlain's counsel being allowed to make
repeated, affirmative representations regarding the content of a document in open court,
while at the same time arguing that that very document is confidential, that it can't be
submitted to any witness, and that knowledge of that document is grounds for
disqualification.
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2003 UT 39,78 P.3d 603, for example, the Utah Supreme Court rejected the argument that
certain parties could not file a lawsuit simply because that lawsuit would require the
examination of confidential information. See generally id, at ^f 10-26. Explaining why the
suit was still permissible, the court noted that "[t]he trial court has numerous tools" that it can
"employ to prevent unwarranted disclosure of the confidential information, including the use
of sealing and protective orders, limited admissibility of evidence, orders restricting the use
of testimony in successive proceedings, and, where appropriate, in camera proceedings." Id.
at ^j22; cf Trail Mountain Coal Co. v. Arco Coal Sales Co., 749 P.2d 637, 638-39 (Utah
1988) (noting that the depositions in the case were taken pursuant to a protective order and
filed under seal, and then holding that the trial court had authority to issue further orders to
protect the confidentiality of those documents).
Any of these tools could have been used in this case. For example, if Dr. Chamberlain
truly believed that Dr. Jacobs had been unduly influenced by Dr. Kane's earlier review, he
could have simply requested that the trial court allow him to conduct a limited examination
of Dr. Jacobs in camera in order to explore the issue. If the court then determined that an
examination regarding this (or any other prelitigation-related area) was necessary during trial,
the trial court could have simply cleared the courtroom and allowed that portion of the crossexamination to be conducted under seal. Such an option would have been particularly
manageable in this case given the fact that this was a bench trial. By exercising these or any
of the other tools that were available to it, the confidentiality of the information could have
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been preserved without depriving Dr. Chamberlain of his stated desire to cross-examine Dr.
Jacobs regarding the confidential information.
It is also worth noting that while § 78-14-12 protects the confidentiality of the
prelitigation proceedings, it would have been eminently possible to have cross-examined Dr.
Jacobs regarding the documents in question without ever discussing the prelitigation panel
at all. Dr. Jacobs did not testify at the prelitigation panel, nor was he in any way involved
in the presentation of Munson's case to that panel. The only connection that he has to the
panel is remote and tangential: specifically, that he reviewed some evidence that had also
been reviewed by the panel in its deliberations.
Thus, Dr. Chamberlain's counsel could have asked Dr. Jacobs any number of
questions about these documents, including questions about when hefirstreceived them, how
much time he spent reviewing them, what his impressions were of those documents, whether
he agreed or disagreed with the statements therein, whether he had done any subsequent
research to learn more about the conclusions raised therein, and, most importantly, what
impact (if any) those documents had had on his thinking. None of these questions would
have required a responsive reference referring to the prelitigation process at all. To the
extent that such a reference was even possible, there is no reason that this minimal danger
could not have been cured by a simple limiting instructionfromthe judge instructing counsel
and witness at the outset to avoid discussing the prelitigation panel in their discussions. As
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such, the argument that cross-examination regarding these issues was not possible is simply
not true.
Second, the suggestion that a witness must be excluded if that witness has viewed
evidence that is inadmissible at trial is simply incorrect as a matter of law. The problem with
this argument is that it confuses the concepts of excluding evidence and excluding witnesses.
While pieces of evidence or even whole areas of inquiry are often excluded from discussion
at trial, courts still routinely allow witnesses who are aware of excluded evidence to testify
regarding any issues that are properly before the court. Were it otherwise-i.e. were it the
case that the only witnesses who could ever testify were those who had not been exposed to
any evidence that was later deemed inadmissible-all motions to exclude evidence would by
definition become de facto motions to disqualify whole categories of witnesses. Similarly,
evidentiary objections made at trial would now have a direct impact on witness lists, rather
than simply on the scope of the evidence. Rather than embracing such a draconian rule, trial
courts are commonly allowed to exercise their case management authority in a way that limits
the issues to be discussed, while at the same time still permitting witnesses to testify
regarding those issues that are properly before the court.
In this case, for example, Dr. Jacobs' expert opinions were based upon his review of
a wide number of admissible sources, thus providing ample, admissible foundation for his
conclusions. Specifically, in the December 31, 2001, letter from Kenneth Parkinson to Dr.
Jacobs, Mr. Parkinson listed the documents that he had provided for Dr. Jacobs' review. See
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R. at 556, Exhibit 1. In addition to the Dr. Kane review and the Notice of Intent, Mr.
Parkinson had enclosed:
4

*
*
•
*

a copy of Dr. Richard Call's medical records;
a copy of Dr. Bruce Chamberlain's and Central Utah Medical Clinic's medical
records;
a copy of Dr. Richard Gremillion's medical records;
a copy of Dr. Richard Rosenthal's medical records;
a copy of Dr. Joseph Watkins' medical records;
a copy of Dr. Doug Jones' medical records; and

•

a copy of Utah Valley Regional Medical Center's emergency room records.

•

Id.
Dr. Chamberlain's counsel had the opportunity during Dr. Jacobs' deposition to fully
explore the foundations for Dr. Jacobs' medical opinions in this case. After initially
discussing Dr. Jacobs' medical background and qualifications, Dr. Chamberlain's counsel
conducted a thorough examination of Dr. Jacobs about his knowledge and opinions of this
case. This portion of the examination spans fifty typed pages in the deposition transcript.
See R. at 390-378 (deposition pages 22-72). During the course of these fifty pages, Dr.
Jacobs did not refer to the Notice of Intent or to Dr. Kane's initial review as being foundation
for his opinion in any of his answers, but instead was wholly reliant upon his own knowledge
as gained from the actual medical records. See id At the conclusion of the deposition, Dr.
Jacobs was then specifically asked whether he had told counsel "all the bases for [his]
opinion." R. at 378 (deposition page 71). He responded that he had. Id.
Given the massive amounts of direct evidence that were available to him and with
which he was clearly familiar, the suggestion that Dr. Jacobs might have nevertheless been
Page 25 of 36

unduly influenced by having viewed two pieces of indirect commentary on that evidence is
highly speculative at best. Even if this speculation is accepted, however, it is still clear that
Dr. Jacobs had clear evidentiary foundation for his opinions, and he therefore should have
been allowed to testify and be cross-examined regarding those opinions, regardless of
whether the prelitigation materials were an open subject for cross-examination.
II.

THIS COURT SHOULD ALSO HOLD THAT DR. CHAMBERLAIN'S
INTERPRETATION OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 78-14-12(l)(d) WOULD
LEAD TO ABSURD RESULTS.
As discussed above, the resolution of this appeal hinges upon the question of what the

Legislature intended when it designated the prelitigation process as "confidential." When
analyzing a statute, courts have been instructed to "read the plain language of the statute as
a whole, and interpret its provisions in harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and
related chapters." Bd. of Educ. of Jordan Sch. Dist. v. Sandy City Corp., 2:004 UT 37, ^|9,
94 P.3d 234. In addition, it "is axiomatic that a statute should be given a reasonable and
sensible construction and that the legislature did not intend an absurd or unreasonable result."
Id (quoting State ex rel. Div. of Consumer Prot. v. GAF Corp.. 760 P.2d 310, 313 (Utah
1988)). Utah courts "construe statutes to ensure that there will be no absurd results,
particularly in the interplay of subsections of a single statute." J. Pochynok Co., Inc. v.
Smedsrud. 2005 UT 39,1J21, 116 P.3d 353.
In cases where the plain language of a statute arguably compels an absurd result, the
courts are required to read the statute so as to avoid that unreasonable application. Thus, "a
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court should not follow the literal language of a statute if its plain meaning works an absurd
result or is unreasonably confused, inoperable, or in blatant contravention of the express
purpose of a statute." Sullivan v. Sullivan, 2004 UT App 485,1f9, 105 P.3d 963.
Here, the "express purpose" of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act is statutorily set
forth in Utah Code Annotated § 78-14-2 (2005). In that section, the Legislature stated its
belief that "the number of suits and claims for damages and the amount of judgments and
settlements arising from health care has increased greatly in recent years." Id. In order to
curb this trend, the Legislature's purpose in setting forth the prelitigation procedures was to
provide "procedural changes to expedite early evaluation and settlement of claims." Id.:
accord Gramlich v. Munsev. 838 P.2d 1131, 1133 (Utah 1992).
If the trial court's conclusion that an expert witness cannot view evidence that has
been submitted to the prelitigation panel is accepted, it would lead to a number of absurd
results that are expressly contrary to the stated purpose behind this statute.
First, though the ruling at issue here was only focused on two of the documents that
were submitted to the prelitigation panel, it is clear from the record that these are not the only
documents that the prelitigation panel actually considered. In addition to the Notice of Intent
and the Dr. Kane review, Mr. Parkinson also submitted the medical records from Dr.
Chamberlain and the Central Utah Medical Clinic, as well as the medical records from Dr.
Gremillion (who subsequently treated Ms. Munson). R. at 556, Exhibit 6. Though these
submissions were simply done as a matter of sound practice, the submission of these medical
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records was also compliant with the statutory scheme, which specifically contemplates that
the panel will have access to the medical records involved in a case. See Utah Code
Annotated § 78-14-13. In the rare instance in which the medical records are not voluntarily
provided to the panel, the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act provides the panel with the
authority to subpoena those records in order to aid the panel in its prelitigation review. See
id. at § 78-14-13(2). As a result, the medical records in this case were as much a part of the
"prelitigation materials" as the Notice of Intent and the Dr. Kane review.
Thus, when Dr. Chamberlain's counsel asserted that "the whole notion [of the Utah
Health Care Malpractice Act] is to keep the evidence that is considered by the pre-litigation
panel confidential," R. at 554, pp. 30-31, and when the trial court then concluded that all
materials that had "previously been submitted to the prelitigation panel" must be kept
confidential, R. at 262, f3; R. at 261 -60, ffl -4, this rule would by definition also encompass
the medical records involved in the case. If accepted by this Court, this ruling would
therefore mean that expert witnesses in medical malpractice cases are no longer authorized
to view the medical records relating to the alleged malpractice. This is an absurd result that
would create havoc in our system, and which is clearly at odds with the stated purpose of the
statute. It ought to be rejected.
Second, if accepted, the trial court's ruling would also create a set of perverse
incentives that would compromise the utility of the prelitigation process. Specifically, if this
Court holds that any document or piece of evidence that is submitted to a prelitigation panel
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must then be shielded from expert witnesses, the practical result would be that lawyers would
then be encouraged to avoid submitting anything of value to the prelitigation panel in order
to avoid a disqualification motion. For example, suppose in this case that Mr. Parkinson had
actually intended for Dr. Jacobs to have relied upon Dr. Kane's review as foundation and
support for his own conclusions. In order to avoid having a problem with § 78-14-12, Mr.
Parkinson would have had to avoid submitting Dr. Kane's report to the prelitigation
panel-thereby depriving the panel of this expert insight. As a direct result, the panel's
decision would have been less informed and less reasoned due to the simple fact that it would
have had less evidence before it.
This particular danger is further exacerbated by the fact that two of the three members
of a prelitigation panel are by statute non-doctors. See Utah Code Annotated § 78-14-12(4).
Given their presumed unfamiliarity with medical literature and procedure, this rule would
hamper their efforts to understand the case by encouraging lawyers to keep their best
witnesses and best evidence farfromthe panel's review. Such a result is expressly contrary
to the stated purpose of the statute, which is to "expedite early evaluation and settlement of
claims." Utah Code Annotated § 78-14-2.
Third, the trial court's interpretation of the statute also creates an absurd result insofar
as it unreasonably places form over substance. The impact of this rule manifests itself
differently with respect to the two different documents at issue here.
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With respect to the Notice of Intent, the specific Notice of Intent that was filed in this
case obviously cannot be attached to this brief under Doe. Utah Code Annotated § 78-14-8
(2005) sets forth the requirements for such notices, however, thus providing a structural
overview for what the document actually contains. Under that statute, the Notice of Intent
was required to have included:
(1) a general statement of the nature of the claim,
(2) the persons involved,
(3) the date, time and place of the occurrence,
(4) the circumstances thereof,
(5) specific allegations of misconduct on the part of the prospective defendant, and
(6) the nature of the alleged injuries and other damages sustained.
Id. (numbering added). In a very real sense, the information that is contained in a Notice of
Intent tracks the information that is typically contained in a civil complaint. Compare Utah
Code Annotated § 78-14-8 with Utah R. Civ. P. 8(a). Thus, like the Notice of Intent, the
Complaint that was filed in the district court in this case included:
(1) a general statement of the nature of the claim (R. at 4-3, ffl|4, 7-13);
(2) the persons involved (R. at 4, ffiJl-3);
(3) the date, time, and place of the occurrence (R. at 3,ffif7-13);
(4) the circumstances thereof (R. at 3, ^7-13);
(5) specific allegations on the part of the prospective defendant (R. at 3-2, ffl[14-18);
and
(6) the nature of the alleged injuries and other damages sustained (see R. at 2, ffi|1923).
In arguing that the prelitigation materials had to be shielded from Dr. Jacobs, Dr.
Chamberlain's counsel specifically rejected the suggestion that the information contained in
a document that had been submitted to a prelitigation panel could simply be resubmitted to
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an expert in different form, instead insisting that the information itselfbecomes confidential
once it has been submitted to a prelitigation panel. R. at 554, pp.30-31. If this were indeed
true, however, then it would also be true that expert witnesses like Dr. Jacobs should now be
prevented from even viewing the Complaint, insofar as the Complaint itself typically
contains the exact same information that was found in the Notice of Intent. This is an absurd
result.
With respect to the Dr. Kane review, the trial court's ruling stands for the proposition
that a retained expert witness is somehow tainted if he or she reads the report of another
expert witness who has also been retained on the case. The problem with this suggestion is
that there is literally nothing in the Utah Code or in the reported cases that in any way states
or even implies that a party is prevented from using the same expert witness at both the
prelitigation proceeding and the trial. Thus, though Dr. Kane's initial review was admittedly
submitted to the prelitigation panel, there is no law that would have prevented him from
continuing to serve as a witness or consultant for the Plaintiff throughout the subsequent
proceedings. As such, his opinions and testimony could have been discussed in future
depositions, hearings, or even the trial itself.
Had this been the case, Munson would have had the services of two experts at her
disposal-a situation that is common in complex cases. In such circumstances, it is
noteworthy that there is no statutory provision or interpretive case that prevents two experts
on one side of a casefromspeaking with one another. Thus, Dr. Kane and Dr. Jacobs could
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have exchanged letters and emails about the case, and then could have discussed their own
opinions and conclusions over the phone or in person. Given this ability, it is therefore
difficult to understand how Dr. Jacobs could be considered to have been tainted in this case
simply because he happened to learn of Dr. Kane's opinions by reading them in a report that
had earlier been submitted to the prelitigation panel, rather than by discussing the case with
Dr. Kane directly.
In essence, the trial court's ruling stands for the proposition that two experts can talk
at length, correspond at length, and exchange research and ideas at length, but that the
moment that one of those experts views a report that the other expert produced, that first
expert has suddenly become tainted if that report happened to have been submitted to the
prelitigation panel. This conclusion is a classic example of placing form over substance, is
an absurd result, and therefore ought to be overturned.
III.

THE DETERMINATION IN DOE v. MARET THAT A NOTICE OF INTENT IS
CONFIDENTIAL SHOULD BE OVERTURNED.
The holding of the Utah Supreme Court in Doe was that a medical malpractice Notice

of Intent should be kept confidential and should not be attached to a public document such
as an appellate brief. As the discussion above demonstrates, nothing in Doe supports the
conclusion that an expert witness must be shieldedfromreviewing any document or records
that happen to also be submitted to the prelitigation panel for review. For the reasons
contained in points I and II, Munson respectfully requests that this Court overturn the
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decisions of the trial courts, thereby bringing logic and consistency to the § 78-14-12/Doe
framework.
If Doe is read, however, as supporting the proposition that an expert witness cannot
view any documents that were earlier submitted to the prelitigation panel, then Munson
respectfully suggests that that decision is wrong and ought to be overturned. Specifically,
the court in Doe concluded that evidence and documentation relating to a medical
malpractice action should be considered part of the "proceedings" of the prelitigation panel
if it is "utilized as part of the prelitigation panel review" or if it "serves as basis for the
prelitigation panel review." Doe, 1999 UT 74 at ^[21. As written, however, the statute only
contemplates that the panel "proceedings" themselves will be rendered confidential. This
statutory prohibition obviously prevents a party from later noting which documents were or
were not submitted to the prelitigation panel,8 from discussing the nature of the testimony or
arguments that occurred before the panel, or even from referring to the substance of the
panel's ruling. The statute simply says nothing, however, about the substance of the evidence
reviewed somehow being rendered confidential as a result of it having been submitted to the
panel. Instead, the statute expressly provides that such documents will be returned to the

8

A party would not be allowed, for example, to object to the submission of a document
at trial by noting that it had not been submitted to the prelitigation panel earlier.
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parties who provided them, see Utah Code Annotated § 78-14-13,-presumably for use in
subsequent proceedings. Doe's conclusion to the contrary was wrong.9
The potential for mischief under Doe is exemplified by this case, wherein § 78-1412(l)(d)'s prelitigation confidentiality requirement was successfully employed as an
offensive weapon designed to weaken the opponent's case at trial. Under this reading of the
statute, parties are therefore now authorized to use the confidentiality requirement of § 7814-12(l)(d) in a variety of aggressive ways, such as by submitting documentation that is
adverse to their position to the panel for the express purpose of preventing its subsequent use
at trial.
Rather than continuing to accept this extra-statutory result, the holding of Doe with
respect to § 78-14-12(l)(d)'s confidentiality ought to instead be overturned. This Court
should therefore hold that neither the Notice of Intent nor the Dr. Kane review should be
considered part of the prelitigation proceedings for purposes of § 78-14-12(l)(d).10

9

Further, the suggestion that the Notice of Intent is somehow an intrinsic part of the
prelitigation panel proceedings is directly contradicted by the statute itself, which requires
such Notices to be filed in dental malpractice cases, even though dentists are exempt from
having to participate in the prelitigation panel proceedings. See Utah Code Annotated § § 7814-8,78-14-12(l)(a).
10

Munson acknowledges that, as an intermediate appellate court, this Court may not
have the authority to grant the relief as requested in point III. For purposes of preserving the
issue for any subsequent review by the Utah Supreme Court, however, Munson still raises
this issue and therefore asks this Court to overrule Doe's holding with respect to § 78-14-12.
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CONCLUSION
This Court should hold that expert witnesses are already authorized under Utah Code
Annotated § 78-14-12(l)(d) and under Doe v. Maret to view all information relating to a
case, regardless of whether the information is confidential or not. The trial court's
conclusion that experts cannot view any information if that information was earlier submitted
to the prelitigation panel was simply incorrect, and all resultant rulings ought to be
overturned by this Court. Specifically, this Court should overturn the order of mistrial and
the grant of summary judgment to Dr. Chamberlain and Central Utah Medical Clinic.
DATED this J J _ day of August, 2006.
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